law that potentially apply when lethal force is being used or contemplated, principally the right to life under international human rights law.
11 5 Joint Committee Report (n 1) para 3.30. 6 Ibid, para 3.25. 7 The Report favours the understanding that attacks by non-state actors can trigger the right of self-defence. See Joint Committee Report (n 1), paras 3.22, 3.29. However, it relies for support on the presence of Security Council resolutions that indicate that attacks of the scale of 9/11 in 2001, or those undertaken by ISIL, can reach the threshold of an 'armed attack' within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter. See SC Res 1368, UN Doc S/RES/1368 (2001) referred to at para 3.14; and SC Res 2249, UN Doc S/RES/2249 (2015) referred to at para 3.28. 8 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (merits)
[1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 195. 9 Under treaty law contained in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and two Additional Protocols of 1977, plus customary international humanitarian law. 10 Articles 42 and 51 UN Charter 1945. 11 Article 2 ECHR; Article 6 ICCPR.
It follows that while the present author largely applauds the Report's willingness to go behind the government's sweeping claims to self-defence, this op-ed points to the fact that the Report too readily accepts uses of force against individual terrorists as justifiable under the self-defence provisions of the jus ad bellum, when the reality is that the circumstances in which a state's sovereign rights are sufficiently under imminent threat from individual terrorists will surely be rare. As the Report states, to 'constitute an "armed attack" for the purposes of the right of self-defence that attack must cross a certain threshold of seriousness or intensity', so that a 'series of minor attacks is not necessarily enough to constitute an armed attack'.
12 It is the case that ISIL as a whole represents a threat to the UK, but it seems to be a step too far for the Report to accept that the attacks already mounted on the UK by ISIL 'satisfy the requirement that there must be an armed attack on the UK which entitles it to invoke the right of self-defence'. 13 The reality is that those (largely unfulfilled) 14 attacks by ISIL indicate that it is a continuing threat to the UK, but that of itself it is not sufficient to trigger the right of selfdefence under the jus ad bellum, since there needs to be proof of an imminent attack by ISIL, and proof that the targeted individual was a part of that imminent attack not simply part of the terrorist group.
In his evidence to the Committee, Michael Fallon, Secretary of State for Defence, gave the example of ISIL's attack in Tunisia in June 2015 that led to the deaths of 30 British tourists, saying that 'if we had known that our 30 citizens were going to be murdered on the beach in Sousse, and we knew that that attack was being directed from a training camp in Libya', military action in self-defence would have been justifiable. 15 Self-defence at the international level is a last resort response to an attack against a state, where there is no choice of means and no moment for deliberation. 16 The Report raises the question of whether the meaning of imminence as identified in the Caroline incident of 1837 17 needs to be modified in the light of the modern terrorist threat, suggesting that a state may be able to exercise its discretion to strike earlier when the attack was being planned rather than just before the attack is realised, but warns against drawing that discretion too widely. Field MP that 'the notion that an individual is on the list until such time as they are assassinated seems to be at odds with the "imminence" requirement in Article 51 of the UN Charter'.
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The Report warns against using force 'pre-emptively against a threat which is too remote, such as attacks which have been discussed or planned but which remain at a very preparatory stage'. 24 Having said that, the Report accepts the need for a 'degree of flexibility', in order to meet the threat from terrorism in an era of instantaneous communication. 25 bello) . 32 The Committee lost sight of the issue before it, which was the government's policy on use of force by drones in self-defence outside of armed conflict, which was put forward by the Prime Minister as the initial justification for the drone strike against Reyaad Khan.
III. Lethal force in defence of individuals under human rights law
If, as would normally be the case, the threat posed by an individual terrorist or a small group of terrorists neither reaches the level of intensity nor the degree of imminence required to trigger state's right to self-defence under the jus ad bellum, then a drone strike taken in response to that threat will violate the sovereignty of the host state. Due to its surgical nature and limited impact a drone strike would probably not be of sufficient gravity as to amount to armed attack against the host state: more likely it would constitute an unlawful use of force or intervention by the drone operating state. 
IV. Conclusion
Although the Report usefully discusses the exercise of the right of self-defence by a state both at the level of protecting the state from imminent attack and at the level of protecting individuals from imminent attack, it is not clear from the Report where one ends and the other begins. Indeed, the Report sees them as entirely separate frameworks: one concerning whether force can be used (jus ad bellum), and one concerning how it should be used (human rights law unless in armed conflict when international humanitarian law applies), 42 rather than seeing both as also being concerned with when lethal force should be used. As well as being concerned with how force should be used, human rights law (and international humanitarian law) still involve questions as to whether and when it should be used. International humanitarian law is more permissive than human rights law in the extent that it allows for greater lethal force and It is not enough for the UK simply to make broad claims to self-defence on the basis of classified intelligence or evidence if it wants to retain a credible policy relating to drone strikes.
The Report should provoke further debate and clarification of these crucial issues, 44 as the UK and other states continue to struggle to adopt controlled and calibrated methods of tacking threats to security in the current age of terror. Claiming that the existence of a state may be threatened by terrorist attacks and threats thereof gives rise to a real danger of fuelling the terrorist ideology that purports to justify random acts of murder. Applied in the way suggested above, the law relating to self-defence is capable of limiting the current tendency of governments to over-react, to escalate violence, and to believe that terrorism can be defeated by the use of lethal force, including by armed drones, against known terrorists.
